

## **Role of Burlington Police Commission in Review of Complaints Against Police Officers**

1. When a complaint is received by the BPD about the conduct of a member of the Burlington Police Department, the chief of police shall cause that complaint to be investigated as soon as practical by an individual or individuals with no interest in or attachment to the issue or officer(s) being investigated.
2. The Chief will maintain a written record of each complaint. That written record will include:
  - The names of the officer(s) involved.
  - The date of receipt of the allegation.
  - The type or nature of the allegation.
  - The name of the person(s) who investigated.
  - The final disposition of each complaint.

In addition, if the complaint involves an allegation of use of force or a weapon, or an allegation of dishonesty or other serious misconduct, the written record will include:

- All action taken in response to the complaint.
  - Identification of all witnesses, documents, evidence, or other information obtained or consulted in the course of the investigation.
3. The written record of each complaint will be considered confidential.
  4. The Commission shall have access to the written records of all complaints, upon request to the Chief.
  5. The Chief will report to the Commission on all complaints against members of the department as follows:
    - For minor complaints, the Chief will provide a verbal or written summary of the complaints and their status or disposition in executive session.
    - For major complaints, such as those involving an allegation of use of force, use of a weapon, dishonesty, discrimination or harassment, or other serious misconduct, or for repeated minor complaints, or for any other conduct for which termination is recommended, the Chief will provide the Commission with a full verbal briefing of the allegations and the recommended disposition of the case in executive session. At the request of any member of the Commission, the Chief will make the written record available for review by the Commission, as well as any audio or video footage, written materials, evidence, or other information related to the allegation.
    - If the complaint has been referred outside of the agency for investigation of possible criminal conduct, the materials will be made available to the Commission in executive

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session once a determination has been made that the materials may be disclosed to the Commission without adversely affecting any possible prosecution.

6. After receipt of the report described above, the Commission may
  - accept the Chief's report and recommended actions in full or in part,
  - request additional information,
  - make a recommendation to the Chief about the investigation, process, disposition (including appropriate sanctions for misconduct), or other aspect of the matter, or
  - postpone action to a later date.
7. The Chief may accept the Commission's recommendations, or if the Chief does not, shall explain to the Commission why he did not accept the recommendation.

**Resolution Relating to**

*DRAFT*

DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY TO POLICE  
COMMISSION TO REVIEW DISPOSITION OF  
COMPLAINTS AGAINST POLICE

**RESOLUTION \_\_\_\_\_**

Sponsor(s): \_\_\_\_\_  
Introduced: \_\_\_\_\_  
Referred to: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Action: \_\_\_\_\_  
Date: \_\_\_\_\_  
Signed by Mayor: \_\_\_\_\_

**CITY OF BURLINGTON**

In the year Two Thousand Seventeen .....

Resolved by the City Council of the City of Burlington, as follows:

1 That WHEREAS, section 184 of the charter of the City of Burlington provides that the Board of Police  
2 Commissioners “shall have such authority and responsibility relating to the management of the police  
3 department, its services and facilities, as may be delegated from time to time by resolution of the city council;”  
4 and

5 WHEREAS, section 190 of the charter provides that the chief of police may investigate and may  
6 dismiss any police officer for conduct such as incompetence, negligence, dereliction of duty, or misconduct  
7 and that Board of Police Commissioners “shall hear any appeal filed in a timely manner with respect to such  
8 actions of the police chief;” and

9 WHEREAS, the residents of and visitors to the City of Burlington have an expectation that the conduct  
10 of the police officers responsible for enforcing the laws conform to the highest standards and avoid bias or  
11 favoritism; and

12 WHEREAS, in the City’s Diversity and Equity Strategic Plan, the City’s diversity and equity  
13 consultant recommended that the City clarify civilian oversight over the police department using a model  
14 based on the Vermont State Police Advisory Council (SPAC); and

15 WHEREAS, the City Council believes that it is in the best interests of the people of the City of  
16 Burlington and the Burlington Police Department (BPD) that the review of allegations concerning misconduct  
17 by police officers towards members of the public be thorough and fair, using a process in which both the  
18 public and the police have confidence; and

19 WHEREAS, the Police Commission serves as a fair and impartial representative body of residents of  
20 the Burlington community; and

21 WHEREAS, both the Police Commission and the Public Safety Committee of this City Council have  
22 considered options for expanding and clarifying the Police Commission to prove effective and responsive  
23 civilian oversight;

24 NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED that the City Council hereby delegates the following  
25 authority and responsibility to the Police Commission, subject to the terms of the Agreement Between City of

**Resolution Relating to Delegation of Authority to Police Commission to Review Disposition of  
Complaints Against Police**

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26 Burlington and the Burlington Police Officers' Association effective July 1, 2014 - June 30, 2018, or any  
27 successor contract ("the Police Union Contract") and the Agreement Between City of Burlington and Local  
28 1343 of the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees effective July 1, 2014 – June 30,  
29 2018, or any successor contract ("The Dispatcher Union Contract):

30       1.       The Commission shall have the authority to review all complaints from the public against  
31 members of the police department as outlined in the attached policy entitled "Role of Burlington Police  
32 Commission in Review of Complaints Against Members of Police Department."

33       2.       The Commission will ensure that citizen complaint forms are available in multiple locations  
34 throughout the City of Burlington, including at the Police Department and online, and that they may be  
35 submitted in a variety of way or locations, including the Chief's office, the City Attorney's Office, the  
36 Commission itself, and the Mayor's Office.

37       3.       The Commission will report back to the Public Safety Committee of this Council, no later than  
38 June 30, 2018, about how this new authority is working and whether it has any recommendations for  
39 improvement.

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Public Safety Committee  
June 22, 2017  
DRAFT Minutes

Committee Members: Councilors Sara Moore (SG) (chair); Adam Roof (AR)

Others Present: Richard Haesler (RH), City Attorney's Office (Committee Staff); City Attorney Eileen Blackwood (EB); Eric Kratochvil (EK), BPD; Jessica Radbord (JR), Vermont Legal Aid; Sarah Russell (SR); Burlington Housing Authority; Stephen Marshall (StM), Homeless Advocate

At 5:34 p.m. Chair Moore commenced the meeting.

1. **Agenda:** motion by AR

second by SM – passes unanimously.

2. **Approval of minutes of 3/20/17:**

Motion by AR to table to July meeting; Second by SM – passes 2-0

**Approval of minutes of 5/2/17:**

Motion by AR to approve; Second by SM – passes 2-0

3. **Public Forum:**

None

4. **Committee Discussion – Police Commission Models**

SM: intending to look at proposal from the Mayor's Office – possibly look and compare w other models.

EB: Recommends adoption of the SPAC model presented

- Spoke with Nancy Sheehan – Chair of SPAC
- Question who investigates ; we do not have internal affairs
- Instead other methods – example: low level problem can be dealt w internally – see superior officer vs extreme misconduct we will retain outside consultant to conduct investigation
- Also HR matters – see complaint against superior
- Can utilize HR and the City Attorney's Office plus outside consultants – some or all depending on the situation
- Option choices are at the discretion of the Chief; can be in consultation with the Mayor
- Can incorporate some of this into the proposal if desired.

SMarshall: Policy should be that the person(s) making decisions should have no interest or attachment re the outcome

EK: transparency and demonstration of fairness is accomplished through providing the record to the Police Commission

EB: See # 2 in the proposal – there is written record of the complaint – codified the record requirements

See # 5 – references “repeated minor complaints” – addresses the individual who becomes a constant problem as included here despite the fact never egregious.

SM: Is there a way to inspect for trends; i.e. identifying repeat offenders of repeat types of problems? Can this be documented without violating confidentiality

AR: Is there any risk for the City – what if the record became public

EB: Confidentiality must be maintained – confidential records cannot be made public or there is the basis for a claim – that is always the case; needs to be understood.

AR: Do all commissions have ability to go go into Executive Session?

EB: Yes

Note – Criminal prosecution may subject material disclosure to limitation by the prosecution – otherwise disclosure of full record to the commission.

Every complaint follows a prescribed protocol.

Note: e.g. verbal reprimand – victim not informed of outcome but provided outreach per protocol. – may include where appropriate closing the loop with disclosure

See mediation example.

JR: I might recommend a written follow-up to a complaint – sometimes helpful – provides PR component with individuals whose police contacts have been characterized as negative

AR: Would request if possible: total number of complaints annually; public versus internal

EB: See # 6 – recommendation from Council

Training for commissions is something we are looking into generally.

Perhaps with enlarged role for Police Commission it would be helpful.

Implicit Bias Training?

EB: We offer Boards/Commission/All City Departments

AR: Thinks Implicit Bias Training for Police Commission – given the selection process/vetting largely political – this seems like a minimum threshold.

EB: See # 7 - the Chief may follow the recommendation or decline the recommendation but provide rationale.

SM: Can this process be referred to the Police Commission for a trial run?

AR: Generally in agreement

AR: Motion to refer – Role of Burlington Police Commission in Review of Complaints Against Police Officers – to be referred to the Police Commission – both the draft resolution and the attached policy – for their review and consideration with all materials included and to respond by January 2018;

SM second; Passes unanimously.

AR: And furthermore – move that Public Safety Committee makes a request to the Chief and to the Police Commission to attempt in good faith to trial run the set out herein during that time period.

SM second; Passes unanimously.

#### 5. Other Business

AR: Motion to approve the acceptance of the Subcommittee on Eviction Crisis Planning & Protocols Report – and for the Committee to forward to the full Council as a Communication with a request that it be accepted and placed on file.

SM second; Passes unanimously.

#### 6. Other Business

AR: Motion to adjourn.

SM second; Passes unanimously.

MEETING ADJOURNED at 6:42 p.m.

# **A History and Current View of Citizen Oversight of Police in the US**

Author: Jaada Longmore

Editor: Laura Hale

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## **Executive Summary:**

The purpose of this report is to examine the development and functionality of citizen oversight. The components of psychological affects and the mental health aspects related to community policing are also discussed. This report contains brief summaries of various citizen oversight models used throughout the country, and highlights recommendations under the Obama administration on 21st century policing.



## I. A Brief History Of Citizen Oversight:

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The concept of citizen oversight was first introduced in the early 1900s and has grown over the last century. In 1953 New York City created what is now known as the Civilian Complaint Review Board (CCRB). Citizen oversight boards became a national issue during the civil rights movement when many people of color were victims of police misconduct and activists called for reform. The National Association for Citizen Oversight of Law Enforcement (NACOLE) began in 1985 and development continued. By 1993 there were iterations of oversight in jurisdictions all over the country, including the appointment of independent auditors as one alternative to a whole body of board members. By 2000 over 100 citizen review boards were in place, according to NACOLE. The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 14141 gave the US Department of Justice's Civil Rights Division the power to investigate systemic abuse by local law enforcement agencies, and today citizen oversight boards are often part of the path to reform for agencies found responsible of misconduct.

### **Citizen Review board timeline:**

**1928:** The Los Angeles Bar Association created a Committee on Constitutional Rights to receive complaints about police misconduct. This committee was an unofficial body with no real power or authority.

**1929:** President Herbert Hoover created the National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, known unofficially as the Wickersham Commission, to survey the U.S. criminal justice system under Prohibition and make recommendations for appropriate public policy.

**1931:** The Wickersham Commission released their report "Lawlessness in Law Enforcement" and recommended the creation of a "disinterested agency" in each city to receive citizen complaints about law enforcement.

**1935:** The New York City Mayor's task force recommended the creation of a committee made up of "five to seven members of mixed race" to receive complaints of police misconduct from citizens of Harlem.

**1948:** Washington DC developed the first official (CRB) Citizen Review Board. It was dissolved due to infrequent use. This board handled a total of 54 complaints from 1948-1964.

**1953:** New York City created the Citizen Complaint Review Board.

**1958:** Mayor Dilworth of Philadelphia created the Police Review Board, later renamed the Police Advisory Board (PAB), made up of citizens that received citizen complaints, referred them to the police department for investigation, and then to the police commissioners for further action after reviewing the police investigative file. The PAB was dissolved in 1969 and reinstated in 1994 as the Police Advisory Commission.

**1966:** New York City's Mayor John Lindsay expanded the pre-existing Citizen Complaint Review Board (CCRB) originally created in 1953, but in November 1966 voters abolished the newly expanded CCRB.

**1970:** Kansas Missouri developed the Office of Citizen Complaint (OCC) that reviewed police investigations, and had no authority or independent power to investigate police complaints.

**1973:** Berkeley California developed the Police Review Commission and was the first citizen oversight board to have any authority to investigate complaints.

## **II. Citizen Review Board Classes as Defined by the International Associations of Chiefs of Police (IACP)**

The IACP offers the following distinctions between Citizen Review Board models:

**Class I: Citizen Review Board.** Citizen complaints are reviewed and investigated, and recommendations for disciplinary or policy action are made by a board comprised wholly of citizens. The board may or may not have subpoena power. Under this model, a citizen review board handles each step on the continuum from original complaint through review, investigation and recommendations for sanctions. This is the most independent citizen review model.

**Class II: Police Review/Citizen Oversight.** Complaints are reviewed and investigated, and recommendations for disciplinary or policy action are made by law enforcement officers, with oversight of each case by a citizen or board of citizens. Under this model, the steps on the complaint continuum are handled by the police. A board of citizen reviewers, or a single individual, reviews those actions/determinations. Since law enforcement conducts the initial fact-finding investigation, the Class II model is considered less independent than Class I.

**Class III: Police Review/Citizen-Police Appeal Board.** Complaints are reviewed and investigated by law enforcement officers in the Internal Affairs Unit, which recommends disciplinary action to the chief. Complainants who are not satisfied with outcomes of investigations can appeal for review to a board composed of both citizens and sworn officers. Under this model, the complaint process is handled by the police. In the event a complainant is not satisfied with the outcome of his or her case, a board that includes police officers undertakes review of how the case was originally investigated. Citizen participation is limited to appeal review only.

**Class IV: Independent Citizen Auditor.** An independent citizen auditor or auditor system reviews the law enforcement agency's internal complaint review process (IA) and makes recommendations as needed. Under this model, the complaint process is fully in the hands of the police. However, an auditor or audit team has access to that process and reviews it for effectiveness and accuracy of findings, making recommendations to improve the process as needed. The auditor reviews completed complaint cases and contacts complainants to assess satisfaction with outcome.

### III. Examples of Citizen Oversight in the US:

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The following existing committees all have one consistent element; they have no direct power to hire or fire members of law enforcement, which limits their ability to perform true citizen oversight. The Maine Criminal Justice Academy Board of Trustees does have the power to decertify police officers, but the majority of members of the board are either law enforcement or government officials.

#### **Police Citizen Review Subcommittee (PCRS)**

Portland, Maine

##### **Overview:**

In November 2001, the Portland City Council created the Police Citizen Review Subcommittee (PCRS) as a subcommittee of the Civil Service Commission. The PCRS consists of six commissioners and one alternate. Members are appointed by the City Manager and the police commission annually appoints one chairperson. The main purpose of the PCRS is to review complaints after final disciplinary action has been taken. The subcommittee will also review complaints after final disciplinary action has been taken and all appeals exhausted, and the case has been closed with no disciplinary action taken. The subcommittee conducts its duties solely to determine the thoroughness, objectivity, fairness and timeline of the police department's internal affairs methods and procedures in regard to citizen complaints against police officers. The subcommittee does not have the power or authority to subpoena or call witnesses to impose or modify any disciplinary action, or lack of action, against police officers.

##### **Duties:**

- Reviews the process of police investigations of citizen complaints to ensure it is thorough, objective, fair, and timely
- Determines whether police take investigative action into citizen complaints against police officers
- Audits the police department's Internal Affairs unit investigative methods and procedures
- Reports to City Manager periodically within a year
- Makes recommendations or proposals for necessary modifications police department's Internal Affairs investigative process
- Reviews statistical analysis of all cases, analyzes the nature and identifiable patterns of complaints (complaints that reached IA investigative process)
- Makes recommendations on policy, training, and developing public trust in the department process of investigation of citizen complaints against police officers.
- Holds public hearings once a year to hear comments about the police citizen complaint process.
- Ensure PCRS reports are made public

#### **The Maine Criminal Justice Academy Board of Trustees**

##### **Overview:**

The purpose of the Maine Criminal *Justice Academy Board of Trustees* is to protect the public health and welfare of Maine by ensuring that the public is served by competent and honest criminal justice practitioners and by establishing minimum standards of proficiency by regulated professions by examining, licensing, regulating and disciplining those in the field of criminal justice. The Board consists of seventeen members, five of whom serve by virtue of their public office. The other twelve members are appointed by the Governor and include representatives from municipal, county, and federal law enforcement, state or country

corrections, and five citizen members who are not and never have been a sworn member of a law enforcement agency. The academy provides a central training facility for all criminal justice personnel.

**Duties:**

- Training and certification of law enforcement and correctional officers
- Establish admission and graduation standards
- Certification of police chiefs, sheriffs, and jail administrators
- Establishing minimum standards for mandatory law enforcement policies
- Certifying instructors and courses for law enforcement and correctional officers in the state
- Board has authority to revoke or suspend the certification of law enforcement or corrections officers who fail to meet training standards and engage in unlawful practices of the profession

**Rochester Civilian Review Board (CRB)**

Rochester, New York

**Overview:**

The purpose of the Rochester Civilian Review Board is to review and make recommendations on completed internal affairs investigations of alleged misconduct by employees of the Rochester Police Department. The CRB, founded in 1973, is housed in the Center for Dispute Settlement and was New York State's first community program of its kind, and one of the first three in the country. The Center provides mediation, facilitation, fact-finding and arbitration programs and services to residents of Western New York including the City of Rochester and surrounding areas, and throughout the Finger Lakes region. Groupings of three CRB panelists are selected on a rotating basis from a pool of qualified individuals of varied ethnic, racial, age and gender backgrounds. Each board contains varied representation, given panelist availability. The panelists have received extensive training in their role as impartial reviewers as well as in police procedures and policies.

The panelists are required to complete a forty hour Principles of Mediation Training and apprenticeship program with Center for Dispute Settlement to become a certified mediator. These aspects of CRB requirements are under the auspices of the New York State Unified Court System, Office of Community Dispute Resolution Centers Program. Panelists must also complete a forty hour training on police policies, procedures and practice. Each new candidate observes a complete session of the CRB review process before being appointed as a panelist.

**Duties:**

- Review allegations of actions by the Rochester Police Department that would constitute a crime, and allegations involving the use of force
- Review investigations of each citizen complaint for thoroughness, fairness, and timeliness and submit their findings directly to the Chief of Police
- Where appropriate, panelist(s) may make training, investigative, or policy recommendations to the Chief of Police

## **Citizen Complaint Review Board (CCRB)**

### **New York City**

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#### **Overview:**

The CCRB is empowered to receive, investigate, mediate, hear, make findings, and recommend action on complaints against New York City police officers alleging the use of excessive or unnecessary force, abuse of authority, discourtesy, or the use of offensive language. The board has 13 members, all of whom must be residents of New York City. Five members are appointed by the City Council, with one board member representing each borough. The mayor also chooses five members, including the chair person, and the final three members are chosen by the police commissioner and must have law enforcement experience. The mayor makes official appointments to the board. No member of the board can have any law enforcement background aside from those appointed from the police commissioner. None of these members can be public employees or serves in any public office. These board members serve three-year terms that can be renewed. These members do receive compensation per session basis. Some board members choose to serve pro-bono.

#### **Duties:**

- Review and evaluate all completed investigations in order to make findings on the allegations in each complaint
- Conduct case reviews
- Forward all cases with one or more substantiated allegations to the police commissioner
- Examine the need for change in police department policies, procedures, training and reports finding
- Recommend solutions to the police commissioner and the public
- Oversee the agency operations through specialized committee and develop agency policies
- Hold monthly public meetings
- Hire the executive director

## **Office of Professional Accountability Review Board (OPARB)**

### **Seattle, Washington**

#### **Overview:**

The development of the OPA was a big turning point in the community review process of discipline and is a result of a Dept. of Justice investigation. This board is made up of seven members appointed by the city council. The mission of the OPARB is to sustain community oversight and provide comprehension of the practices and the employee accountability system. This board has an independent auditor who is appointed by the mayor and approved by the city council. The duties of the auditor are to ensure the thoroughness, fairness and timeline of OPA investigations and the departments policies and practices and makes recommendations accordingly. This structure was developed to ensure the thoroughness of transparency in the investigations. The board upholds their mission of the OPA to ensure public trust into communities. All allegations made against an employee of the Seattle police department go through an extensive review process as well as an independent review. Misconduct investigations are typically investigated by the independent auditor. The investigations consists of detailed interviews with the complainant and officers involved, the identifying and interviewing of witnesses, collecting and reviewing evidence, obtaining copies of the police reports relating to incident. Once investigation is completed it is given to the director of board

and the auditor. The director then confirms that no further investigation is required furthermore the case is reviewed to determine whether or not misconduct occurred. There are six different classes of findings. Sustained, not sustained (unfounded), not sustained (lawful and proper), not sustained (training referral) not sustained (management action). Current court decisions ruled in making these files available to the public

#### **Duties:**

- Review the quality of the accountability system
- Promote public awareness of and full access to the system
- Obtain information and opinions from police officers and the community on police practices and accountability
- Advise the City on police practices and accountability
- Conduct an independent review of the quality of the OPA complaint and investigation process for fairness
- Review police policies and procedures
- Research national trends and best practices on police accountability and police practices,
- Report to the community, City government, and the Police Department, on the citizen input it receives and the results of its independent review and research
- Recommend topics to the OPA Auditor for the Auditor's review of OPA

#### **VT State Police Advisory Commission (SPAC)**

##### **Overview:**

The commission is made up of seven members who are all citizens of Vermont with no employment connection to VSP. Members are all appointed by Governor. All allegations of misconduct by State Police officers are given to the State Police Advisory Commission (SPAC) for review. By statute, SPAC is made up of independent Vermont citizens who have no connection to the Vermont State Police. The State Police Advisory Commission provides advice and counsel to the Commissioner of Public Safety in carrying out his or her responsibilities for the management, supervision and control of the Vermont State Police. The Commission also advises the Commissioner regarding rules concerning promotions, grievances, transfers, internal investigations and discipline

VSP offers three different ways for a citizen to make a complaint against a VT State police officer - either online, by email, or directly to one of the barracks. The complaint is assigned to a commander in the area where the event occurred. If the complaint goes further to the internal Affairs Office, the citizen will be contacted by an investigator from the IA unit from the VSP. The investigator will examine any evidence based on the Code of Conduct violations. The investigator will review the reports and all records pertaining to the case and write a report on any findings in the case. The report is reviewed by the chain of command for the members whom complaint was made against. The Commissioner of Public Safety makes the determination of whether or not a violation of the Code of Conduct actually occurred. The commissioner will impose discipline. The complainant will receive a letter stating whether or not the Code of Conduct was violated. The results in turn are then directed back to SPAC.

The need for SPAC is still in question as it relates to bias policing. Studies and current statistics show that racial and ethnic profiling does in fact exist. Disproportionate racial and ethnic minority representation in VT jails indicates that these groups are incarcerated by our police at a rate 50% higher than whites.

## IV. President Obama's Task Force on 21<sup>st</sup> Century Policing

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The President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing final report released in May 2015 produced recommendations that are outlined within each of the six pillars identified. The six pillars are:

1. Building Trust and Legitimacy
2. Policy and Oversight
3. Technology and Social Media
4. Community Policing and Crime Reduction
5. Training and Education
6. Officer Safety and Wellness

**Pillar One: Building Trust and Legitimacy** "Law enforcement culture should embrace a guardian—rather than a warrior—mindset to build trust and legitimacy both within agencies and with the public. Toward that end, law enforcement agencies should adopt procedural justice as the guiding principle for internal and external policies and practices to guide their interactions with rank and file officers and with the citizens they serve. Law enforcement agencies should also establish a culture of transparency and accountability to build public trust and legitimacy"

**Pillar Two: Policy and Oversight** "To ensure policies are maintained and current, law enforcement agencies are encouraged to periodically review policies and procedures, conduct nonpunitive peer reviews of critical incidents separate from criminal and administrative investigations, and establish civilian oversight mechanisms with their communities"

**Pillar Three: Technology and Social Media** Implementing new technologies can give police departments an opportunity to fully engage and educate communities in a dialogue about their expectations for transparency, accountability, and privacy

**Pillar Four: Community Policing and Crime Reduction** "Law enforcement agencies should avoid using law enforcement tactics that unnecessarily stigmatize youth and marginalize their participation in schools (where law enforcement officers should have limited involvement in discipline) and communities In addition, communities need to affirm and recognize the voices of youth in community decision making, facilitate youth participation in research and problem solving, and develop and fund youth leadership training and life skills through positive youth/police collaboration and interactions"

**Pillar Five: Training and Education** "To ensure the high quality and effectiveness of training and education, law enforcement agencies should engage community members, particularly those with special expertise in the training process and provide leadership training to all personnel throughout their careers. One specific method of increasing the quality of training would be to ensure that Peace Officer and Standards Training (POST) boards include mandatory Crisis Intervention Training (CIT), which equips officers to deal with individuals in crisis or living with mental disabilities, as part of both basic recruit and in-service officer training—as well as instruction in disease of addiction, implicit bias and cultural responsiveness, policing in a democratic society, procedural justice, and effective social interaction and tactical skills".

**Pillar Six: Officer Wellness and Safety** The wellness and safety of law enforcement officers is critical not only for the officers, their colleagues, and their agencies but also to public safety. Pillar six emphasizes the support and proper implementation of officer wellness and safety as a multi-partner effort. Two specific strategies recommended for the U.S. Department of Justice include (1) encouraging and assisting departments in the implementation of scientifically supported shift lengths by law enforcement and (2) expanding efforts to collect and analyze data not only on officer deaths but also on injuries and "near misses."